The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on Friday issued risk mitigation steps that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should consider during its acquisition of a new system to replace BioWatch, the federal government’s current biodetection system for detecting aerosolized biological attacks.
Since its formation, DHS has faced numerous challenges in acquiring biodetection capabilities to replace BioWatch, which the department started in 2003 in response to the 2001 anthrax attacks to provide early indication of an aerosolized biological weapon attack that includes invisible, odorless, microscopic particles that are difficult to detect and could lead to “catastrophic consequences” for America’s population, agriculture, environment, and economy, the GAO says.
“Since the program’s inception, DHS has pursued enhancements and replacements to the existing BioWatch system without success,” according to the GAO’s new report, DHS Exploring New Methods to Replace BioWatch and Could Benefit from Additional Guidance, which it released on May 20. “These efforts were designed to further reduce the time to detection in order to limit morbidity and mortality from aerosolized biological attacks.”
Currently, due to ongoing pressure from Congress and various administrations, DHS is set to acquire “a system-of-systems concept” known as Biological Detection for the 21st Century (BD21), which is intended to combine various technologies — such as biological sensors, data analytics, anomaly detection tools, collectors, and field screening devices — that aim to enable faster, more efficient detection of an aerosolized attack involving a biological agent compared to BioWatch.
As the watchdog for Congress, the GAO was asked to conduct a review to assess technical maturity and determine whether DHS could benefit from additional guidance as the BD21 program develops.
“In light of DHS’s past efforts and current approach, you have raised questions about the reliability of the existing BioWatch system, the approaches DHS is pursuing with BD21, and the adequacy of the science of biodetection technology,” the report authors told Congress in the report.
“Evaluating how these systems fit within the broader biodefense enterprise that must address a vast array of evolving biological threats, including naturally occurring infectious diseases, is part of the ongoing implementation of the National Biodefense Strategy, which we have previously reported requires continued oversight,” wrote report authors Karen Howard, director of GAO’s Science, Technology Assessments, and Analytics team, and Chris Currie, director of GAO’s Homeland, Security, and Justice team.
They noted that the BD21 program is early in the acquisition lifecycle and DHS has not yet selected the technologies to be used. However, they pointed out that BD21 already faces technical challenges due to “inherent limitations” in the technologies and uncertainties with combining technologies for use in biodetection.
For example, biological aerosol sensors that monitor the air are supposed to provide data on biological material in the environment, but common environmental material such as pollen, soil and diesel exhaust can emit a signal in the same range as a biological threat agent, resulting in increased false alarm rates, according to the GAO report.
“Program officials report that the risk of false alarms produced by biological sensor technologies could be reduced by using an anomaly detection algorithm in addition to the sensor,” the authors wrote. “However, it is too early to determine whether integration of an anomaly detection algorithm will successfully mitigate the false alarm rate. Specifically because the algorithms have never been developed and used for the purpose of biodetection in an urban, civilian environment.”
And while DHS is following GAO’s acquisition policy and guidance to mitigate such technological risks in acquisition programs, and plans to conduct technology readiness assessments (TRA) throughout the purchasing process, other efforts also should be undertaken, the GAO authors wrote.
For instance, DHS in 2020 issued a TRA guide that GAO says lacked detailed information about how the department would ensure objectivity and independence, which are among several best practices GAO has identified in its previously released TRA best practices guide.
“If DHS follows GAO’s best practices guide, decision makers and program managers will be in a better position to make informed decisions at key acquisition decision events,” the agency recommended in the new report.
Another recommendation for executive action by Congress is that the Secretary of Homeland Security ensure the BD21 program conducts TRAs that follow GAO best practices prior to the program’s acquisition decision, wrote the report’s authors, who noted that DHS already has concurred with all of GAO’s recommendations.